ISRAEL VS. HEZBOLLAH – FOURTH-GENERATION WARFARE

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Abstract: Throughout history, war can be categorized into four distinct generations, starting with direct military tactics, minimal technical improvement and changing its course with the third generation's indirect approach attack strategies until reaching a decentralized style of combat where states are losing control of classical dynamics. In terms of conflict, the fourth generation resembles insurgency and guerrilla warfare, as we can see in the case of the 2006 lebanon war which, respecting the characteristics and peculiarities of this kind of conflict, involved a violent non-state actor in conflict with a state entity, and included acts of genocide against civilians, mass-media manipulation, perception management through propaganda and much more. In conclusion, we are now seeing a new, hybrid type of war, to which it seem we do not know how to respond yet or countersince the factor of insurgents' decentralization goes against everything previously taught in terms of tactics and strategies. Due to its problematic nature defensive methods are needed, for example, in terms of propaganda better control over media is crucial.

Key Word: Fourth, Generation, War,Israel, Lebanon, Terrorism, Proxy, Hybrid, United Nations.

Introduction

War is considered both an ancient, universal human nature trait and a specific socio-cultural phenomenon.Its causality is difficult to establish, but obviously, it has developed over time with the progress of civilization and technology. In terms of definition, war is a state of armed conflict between different societies or state entities. In terms of defining elements, it is characterized by extreme violence, destruction, and death through the use of regular, irregular and asymmetrical military force.[1]

Experts, now a day, believe that this phenomenon can be divided into four conceptual distinct generations. This differentiation was published in October 1989 as a study into the *"Marine Corps Gazette"* entitled *"The changing face of war"*[2]and at that moment was criticized and considered a simplistic categorization. However, 17 years later in 2006, these concepts were extensively developed in the book *"The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century"* by Colonel Thomas X. Hammes.[3]

From a conceptual standpoint, first-generation warfare is considered to be based on direct use of military tactics, attack lines and columns dating from the eighteenth century. This type of strategy being the only feasible one because of the military equipment of the time, which today is regarded as a rudimentary, such as muskets. According to William S. Lind in his article titled *"Understanding Fourth Generation War,"*first-generation warfare begins with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended The Thirty Years' War.[4]Currently, this type of war is considered to be inapplicable in any conflict as it leads to a large number of casualties. More broadly, first-generation warfare stipulates that soldiers advance slowly in line, facing the enemy lines.

Second-generation warfare cannot be considered an important advancement in terms of military strategy, but because of important technical development, although there was still a dependency of firing lines and linear movement, an emphasis was put on the importance of artillery and using less predictable strategies. In World War I, although in many aspects it can be considered as belonging to the next generation, at its beginning warring camps have focused on tactics and strategies of direct attack, according to the first two generations.

Third-generation warfare is characterized by indirect attack strategies. Unlike the first two, the emphasis is an intelligence's role in infiltrating and restructuring combat enemy forces to avoid direct confrontations that are more destructive and cause large numbers of casualties. An example of this the

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[1]Cambridge Dictionary, Definitions, Cambridge, retrieved 01.12.2016, from http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/war

[2] Lind, William S|,Nightengale, Keith, Schmitt, John F, Sutton, Joseph W,Wilson, Gary*, „The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation"*, Marine Corps Gazette (pre-1994), , October 1989, Quantico

[3] Alex Deep, *„Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques"*, Small Wars Journals, published 02.02.2015, retrieved 01.12.2016, from http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo7/no1/book-livre-06-eng.asp

[4] William S. Lind, *„Understanding Fourth Generation War"*, antiwar.com, published 05.01.2004, retrieved 01.12.2016,from http://www.antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702

Stoßtruppen German troops during World War I attempted, using infiltration techniques to deconstruct French and English trench warfare to generate and exploit their vulnerabilities. One of the most negative aspects of third-generation warfare is that it exponentially increases the number of victims among civilians and non-combatant forces. Unlike the first two generations, elements from this one constituted the basis for the fourth wave of war.

Fourth-generation warfare

Unlike the first generation, this type of conflict is a return to a decentralized form of combat where state forces lose control of classical dynamics. For example, the conflict between the military forces of a state and a non-state combatant actor. Although the fourth generation is considered to be the latest, a rudimentary form can be considered popular uprisings in the great empires of antiquity.

The clearest illustration of this type of conflict can be analyzed during the Cold War, when major powers were trying to keep control of the colonies and previously captured territories. Amid the impossibility of reiterating a new world conflagration, due to the possibility of nuclear war, both state and non-state entities (conscious of their military inferiority) used educational / propaganda tactics, misinformation, terror, and / or confusion to offset the technological gap. The climax came of the expansion of the power centers of super-states such as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in this period, when lower interest groups or sometimes non-state entities have used this typology of war to partly recover territorial control after the expansion.

Since there is a considerable variety of forms that make up what might be considered fourth-generation warfare, it is often hard to define exactly such a concept by examining just a case by itself. Most often, it describes a group of insurgents or any other non-state actor's violent attempts by various means to implement a plan leading to the establishment of their own government, for example the obsession of the Islamic State of creating a new Caliphate, or either to the restoration of an old government in the detriment of the current administration such as for example the Russian Federation plan to impose pro-Russian governments in the Black Sea countries. Of course, more significant, as defining elements of this generation of war are long-term strategies and tactics of these non-state entities which prefer to invest in delegitimizing, weakening and disorganization of state forces. Whether we take into consideration propaganda, infiltrating non-state representatives in governments or guerrilla attacks, the basic idea is to create a favorable climate for takeover. For example, during the 2016 US elections, and of course some time before the start of the campaign, the Russian forces either by means of hacking and cyberterrorism or by media propaganda have tried (according to US intelligence sources) to impose the candidate that was closer to Russian interests.

Most often fourth-generation warfare conflicts involve either failed states or states in a state of civil war. We can particularly discuss conflicts involving non-state actors, ethical problems, religious intractable problems, or disparities of conventional military forces. Although there are peculiarities like in the case of the Russian Federation interests, most of these conflicts occur in the *"Nonintegrated Areas"*- a concept introduced by Thomas Bennet (picked up by the Pentagon[5]) between limited military forces which are in a permanent opposition with *"Core States Group".*[6]

This fourth generation has some elements in common with traditional low-intensity conflicts in its classical forms of insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Just like in the case of small wars, the conflict is initiated by the "weaker" part through actions that can be termed offensive. The difference lies in how the opponents of the fourth generation adapt these traditional concepts to today's current conditions. These conditions are shaped by technology, globalization, religious fundamentalism, and a change in moral and ethical norms that gave legitimacy to certain issues previously considered restrictions on the conduct of war. This produces new types of war of both offensive and defensive states.[7] We can notice that, from a conceptual standpoint, there are now numerous military conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, that can be assigned to the fourth-generation warfare.

Features and elements of fourth-generation warfare

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[5] Thomas Baneet, Glossary- Gap, retrieved 02.12.2016, from http://thomaspmbarnett.squarespace.com/glossary#Gap

[6] TDAXP, „*The definition of the functioning core and the non-integrating gap*", TDAXP, published 12.08.2008, retreived 02.12.2016, from http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2008/08/21/the-definition-of-the-functioning-core-and-the-non-integrating-gap.html

[7]Ghanshyam. S. Katoch, „*Fourth Generation War: Paradigm For Change*", Masters Thesis submitted at The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Available from Defence Technical Information centre, 06.2015, pag 24

The main feature of a fourth generation war is the conflagration of a violent ,non-state actor and a state. This fight occurs both physically, for example the militant group Hezbollah against Lebanon's leadership or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against Sri Lanka, and propaganda. In this context, violent, non-state actors use all three levels of the fourth-generation warfare. These are either physical (military combat), mental (the will to fight, faith in victory, ideology, propaganda, etc.) or moral (cultural norms, etc.).

Insurgent groups that adopt the fourth-generation warfare have the following features:
- lack of hierarchical authority;
- lack of formal structure;
- patience and flexibility;
- the ability to hide from the public when needed;
- reduced size.[8]

This type of militants can use insurgent, terrorist or guerrilla tactics waging a war against a nation's infrastructure. Fourth-generation warfare takes place on all fronts: economical, political, media, military and civilian.

Of course, fourth-generation warfare may also have humanitarian causes, morally justified, when it takes the form of peaceful resistance. This is carried out through non-violent means, such as for example Gandhi's opposition against the British Empire or Martin Luther King's marches for the rights of African-Americans. In both cases, non-violent parts being pressed by a state entity much stronger appeal to factors of moral, psychological persuasion to put pressure on the state and to raise the issue of the illegitimacy of government action.

Another feature is that, unlike third-generation warfare, violent militant forces can be completely decentralized. In rare cases, there may not be an independent organization, but smaller groups forming improvised alliances to achieve a higher level of threat against the targeted government. As a result, these alliances are weak and if the military leadership of the state is fairly well consolidated, based on intelligence analyses, it can restructure and even destroy these groups.

There are numerous fourth-generation warfare objectives, but mainly two are more important, namely: survival of the violent non-state entity and maintaining an acceptable level of resources; convincing the opposite side that the measures implemented are unfeasible.[9]

The most important factor in managing situations in this generation of war are the centers of political power which after the Cold War and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in a new geopolitical structure. With the strengthening of the European Union and the expansion of globalization, factors such as nationalism, religion, or the ethnic group of belonging are no longer a major concern for the civil public.

Although this is an important fact in fighting against violent, non-state actors, who often based their actions on ideologically popular support, it is also a dangerous factor as the disorganization of militant forces like guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents, caused by the lack of a political center, makes fighting, deconstructing and removing them harder for the democratic forces.[10]

One possible scenario, in a fourth-generation fight between a state and for example, a violent, non-state entity may be based on less aggressive tactics than the military but equally effective. For example the use of Cyber terrorism and International Law elements to achieve objectives and small victories of the weak force in an attempt to discredit the democratic moral appearance. The moment the citizen notices that his state was involved in military operations that led to a large number of atrocities such as the MRF-SAS-MI6 intervention in Ireland he will tend to be on the weaker force's side, in this case,the IRA.

So we can talk about a number of modern terrorism attributes that marked the transition from a classic command model and military patterns of control to a hybrid structure.[11] The most important attributes are:

1. Unlike the traditional pattern of trying a direct destruction of the target, today a greater importance is given to the systemic disruption of its targeted objective with the aim of a slow destruction so large, decisive attacks were replaced with smaller, more frequent assaults.

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[8] Thornton, Rod, „Asymmetric Warfare. Malden", MA: Polity Press, 12.2006,

[9] Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, „*Four Generations of Warfare' in The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century*", St. Paul, MN. 2006, p 293.

[10] George Friedman, „*Beyond Fourth Generation Warfare*", Stratfor Forecasting, 17.07.2007, p 1

[11] John F. Schmitt, „*Command and (Out of) Control The Military Implications of Complexity Theory*", published 07.03.2004, retrieved 02.12.2016, from http://www.virtualschool.edu/mon/Bionomics/MilitaryImplications.html

2. With the technological development of the twenty-first century, terrorists use increasingly often electronic means (including social media and complex media production systems) to achieve a non-linear transmission of their propaganda message.[12]

3. In the past terrorist networks were organized in a hierarchical model similar to dictatorial monarchies, where the leader was considered to be the only authority figure, but fourth generation militant groups adopt either cephalic structures (e.g. al-Qaeda, after Bin Laden's elimination they made the transition to this model) or polycephalic structures (such as separatists in Kashmir).

The defining elements of this type of conflict are still under debate, but there is a consensus on the peculiarities and differences of these conflicts. Fourth-generation warfare:

• Takes place over a longer period of time;
• Is more complex than warfare of previous generations;
• Uses terrorist-specific tactics;
• One of the forces is decentralized, without a national or trans-national base;
• Can include direct acts against the enemy's culture, including acts of genocide against civilians;
• The war has highly sophisticated psychological elements achieved, especially through mass-media manipulation;
• Uses a range of political, economical, social and military pressures;
• Occurs as a low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks;
• Noncombatants are tactical dilemmas;
• Small in size;
• Communication network and financial support;
• Uses insurgency and guerrilla tactics.

As previously shown there is still no consensus on the concept of fourth-generation warfare, for example, Antulio Echevarria within the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army considers that what is described by this concept defines insurgency and that there is no sufficient evidence of differentiation to consider the existence of fourth generation conflicts. In his opinion "the generational model is a completely ineffective way of describing the evolution of insurgent tactics."[13]

However, as shown before, it is obvious that if we were to abandon this terminology, the networks'developments, and militant strategies bring a new set of developments to which classic counterterrorism tactics are ineffective.

Case Study: The 2006 Lebanon War as fourth-generation warfare

The military conflict in Lebanon also called the *2006 Israel-Hezbollah War* or the *July War* was a military 34 days conflict deployed on the territory of Lebanon, Northern Israel and the Golan Heights. The actors were Hezbollah, paramilitary forces and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The conflict began on July12, 2006 and continued until the United Nations intermediated a ceasefire agreement which became effective on the morning of August 14, 2006. The conflict ended on September 8,2006, with the lifting of Lebanon's naval blockade by Israel. Due to unprecedented Iranian military support for Hezbollah before and during the war some believe that it was the first round of the Iran-Israel proxy conflict rather than a continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[14]

The conflict was made based on the Zar'it-Shtula incident. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fighters fired rockets towards Israeli border towns as a diversion for an anti-tank missile attack against two armored Humvees patrolling the Israeli side of the border fence.[15] The ambush resulted in three casualties and two Israeli soldiers that were kidnapped and taken to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In response, five people were killed in Lebanon in a failed rescue attempt. Hezbollah demanded the release of the Lebanese prisoners detained by Israel in exchange for the release of the abducted soldiers. Israel refused and responded with air strikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon. Israel attacked both Hezbollah military targets and the Lebanese civilian infrastructure elements,

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[12] John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, *„Networks, netwar, and information-age terrorism"*, RAND, 1991, p 75-111

[13] Antulio J. Echevarria, *„Deconstructing the theory of fourth-generation war"*, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 26, published 04.08.2006, retrieved 1.12.2016, from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260500211066?src=recsys&journalCode=fcsp20

[14] Eyal Zisser, „Iranian Involvement in Lebanon" (PDF). Military and Strategic Affairs. 3 (1). 05.2011

[15] Greg Myre and Steven Erlanger, „Clashes spread to Lebanon as Hezbollah raids Israel", Herald Tribune, published 12.09.2006, retrieved 01.12.2016, from https://web.archive.org/web/20090129193940/http://iht.com/articles/2006/07/13/africa/web.0712mideast.php

including Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport.THE IDF launched a ground invasion into Southern Lebanon and also imposed a naval blockade. Hezbollah then launched more rockets into Northern Israel and engaged in the guerrilla battles against the IDF. The conflict has caused between 1,191 and 1,300 deaths in the Lebanon camp (mostly civilians) and 165 Israelis (including 44 civilians).[16]

On August 11, 2006, the Security Council of the United Nations unanimously approved United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (UNSCR 1701) in an effort to end hostilities. The resolution, which was approved by both governments - Lebanese and Israeli- and stipulated the disarmament of Hezbollah's military wing, the withdrawal of IDF troops from Lebanon as well as the Lebanese army deployment along the *"United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon" (UNIFIL)*[17] mission. This mission received a broad mandate, including the ability to use force to ensure that in their area of operations no hostile activities occur as well as to create resistance against insurgent attempts of force. In the time since the adoption of Resolution 1701, both the Lebanese government and UNIFIL have declared they will not disarm Hezbollah.[18]

This war is one of the most relevant examples of hybrid war. The military wing of Hezbollah is a violent and sophisticated non-state actor, largely sponsored by Iran. While the group often acts as a proxy for Iranit, of course, has its own interests. Kidnapping Israeli troops, as a strategic decision, rather belongs to Iran than Hezbollah, as an impulse for war.[19] This conflict involved approximately 3,000 Hezbollah fighters hidden among civilians from the local population against about 30,000 Israelis troops.[20]

The militant group used, decentralized cells composed of guerrillas and army troops using both regular weapons such as missiles, precision missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, armed drones and improvised explosive devices.[21] Hezbollah cells have shot down Israeli helicopters, destroyed Merkava IV tanks, communicated through encrypted mobile phones, and monitored Israeli troop movements with thermal imaging devices. This advanced military equipment, as well as the combatants' training, was provided by Iranian Special Forces Quad Force.[22]

Through a system of mass communication,Hezbollah facilitated immediate distribution of photos and videos to the public showing atrocities committed against civilians by Israel to create a certain type of perception in the media. Israel did not lose the war on the battlefield, but lost the battle of information and public perception, since the militant group had as an objective perception management.[23] It should be emphasized that these propaganda successes came with a heavy cost for Lebanon, over 1,000 individuals were killed, mostly civilians. Israel achieved its political aim discouraging Hezbollah attacks - from summer 2000 to summer 2006, Hezbollah has carried out about 200 attacks on Israel, but since then until now Hezbollah has completely refrained from attacking Israel.

Conclusion

Although there is criticism in the strategic study domain regarding definitions and terminology, the world today faces a new type of war. Due to the massive development of a military power imbalance between the main centers of power and violent, non-state actors, the latter appeal to different elements of hybrid war to impose their political interests. It is becoming increasingly clear that major power centers fail to think of a strategy to combat this type of war –obvious fact of the failure to secure the Middle Eastern States which are dominated by this kind of conflict between propaganda and insurgent attacks from various decentralized groups.

Also, although theoretically fourth-generation warfare is based on a conflict between a violent, non-state entity and a state entity, we can see that this is the kind of war the Russian Federation has turned to in the last decade, for both conflicts such as in Ukraine, Georgia and also Syria, engaging in both classical military combat and decentralized, proxy combat using different groups to achieve its interests. Regarding the

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[16]Ibidem 15

[17] UN News Centre, „*Lebanon: UN peacekeepers lay out rules of engagement, including use of force",* retrieved 01.12.2016, from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20106&Cr=Leban&Cr1=

[18] Spiegel Online, „*Who Will Disarm Hezbollah?"*,published 16.08.2006, retrieved 02.12.2016, from http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-un-force-who-will-disarm-hezbollah-a-432019.html

[19] Ibidem 3

[20] Greg Grant, „*Hybrid Wars"*,Govexec, published 01.05.2008, retrieved 01.12.2016, from http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2008/05/hybrid-wars/26799/

[21] Hoffman, Frank, „*Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War"*, 2007, Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. pp. 35–38

[22] Ibidem 20

[23] Ibidem 21

propaganda element, Russia has made a considerable effort to influence the US presidential election and it is assumed that in the future it will increasingly invest more such attacks against the European Union.

A feasible solution to combat this generation of warfare from the perspective of propaganda is to exercise a greater control over the media, of course without limiting the democratic principle of freedom of expression, by regulating certain institutions that through means of intelligence analysis will assess data and information submitted to the public. Following the identification of false elements in order to promote propaganda, these institutions will publicly communicate them analysis result. As for the decentralized groups that engage in the insurgency,they should be identified and have their main funding sources eliminated.

In conclusion, fourth-generation warfare is considerably the most problematic of all generations because Western Society has developed strategies over time to combat hierarchically organized groups, but it is this factor of insurgents' decentralization that is an easily exploitable vulnerability. On the other hand, the biggest concern is perception management, since democratic institutions depend on the citizen's support and this factor, I believe, is the one that started and can eliminate such conflicts.

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[8]. Greg Grant, *„Hybrid Wars"*,Govexec, published in 01.05.2008, retrieved in 01.12.2016 http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2008/05/hybrid-wars/26799/

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